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JAPAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: LESSONS AND LIMITA-
TIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY. Edited by Hugh Patrick. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 1986. Pp. xxi, 277. $40. 
Japan's High Technology Industries is a collection of essays devel-
oped as part of a project organized in 1983 "to provide a careful, ob-
jective analysis and evaluation of Japanese high technology industrial 
policy and assess its relevance for the United States" (p. ix). This pro-
ject was sponsored by the Committee on Japanese Economic Studies 
(p. x). As outlined in the book's introduction, the authors are not in 
complete agreement with each other's analyses and conclusions (pp. x-
xx). Thus, the book offers the reader a variety of perspectives on Ja-
pan's high technology industries, by which the authors generally mean 
the microelectronics1 and biotechnology industries. Hugh Patrick2 ed-
ited the collection, provided a thoughtful introduction, and also au-
thored the first essay, an overview of Japan's high technology 
industrial policy. The authors of the individual essays are professors 
of business or the social sciences in the United States and Japan. Con-
sequently, the book is not written in the style of a legal treatise; its 
discussions of industrial policy provide few citations to legal materials 
and do not emphasize the role oflaw. Thus, while this book may be of 
limited practical value to lawyers, it does provide an interesting and 
useful introduction to Japanese industrial policy. 
Patrick's opening essay provides a broad conceptual overview of 
high technology industries and industrial policy in general and a de-
scription of Japanese industrial policy in particular. Japanese indus-
trial policy has been motivated by a pragmatic desire to foster the 
rapid growth of future key industries while easing the decline of un-
competitive industries, or as Patrick puts it, "picking winners and 
phasing out losers" (p. 10). His examination of Japanese industrial 
policy shows that it has been responsive to market forces and changing 
economic analysis, but not always well conceived. 3 Indeed, he finds 
1. The authors include semiconductors, computers, and telecommunications within the 
microelectronics industry. P. xiii. 
2. R.D. Calkins Professor of International Business in the Graduate School of Business, Co· 
lumbia University. Other works include JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES TODAY: EXCHANGE 
RATES, MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND FINANCIAL MARKET INNOVATIONS (H. Patrick & T. 
Ryuichiro eds. 1987); JAPANESE INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ITS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (H. Pat-
rick ed. 1976); AslA'S NEW GIANT: How THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS (H. Patrick & H. 
Rosovsky eds. 1976). 
3. P. 9. Since World War II, Japan's industrial policy has often been ad hoc, neither care-
fully thought out nor well focused. During the postwar period, the goals of Japanese industrial 
policy have slowly evolved. Initially it was oriented toward the domestic market and favored 
heavy manufacturing and transportation industries. P. 9. During the 1960s, the government 
promoted the growth of energy-intensive industries that were subsequently rendered uncompeti-
tive by the energy price increases of the 1970s. P. 18. Government attempts to restructure the 
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that while Japan's industrial policy has been somewhat beneficial for 
its economy, the effects have been vastly overrated.4 After discussing 
the successes and failures of Japan's industrial policy, Patrick turns to 
Japan's current policy needs, which have changed significantly in the 
last fifteen years.5 He concludes by discussing the relevance of Japa-
nese industrial policy for the United States. 6 Patrick argues that as 
long as the multilateral exchange rate system 7 "is truly open, multilat-
eral, freely operating, and based on the free fl.ow of goods, services, 
and capital," it serves as a mechanism of adjustment that incorporates 
differences in economies and industrial and economic policies. 8 Thus, 
American policy should work to improve the exchange rate system in 
order to integrate the Japanese economy into the world economic sys-
tem (p. 31). 
The succeeding chapters provide in-depth descriptions of individ-
ual Japanese policies and examine the effects of those policies on vari-
ous high technology industries. While a variety of topics, including 
education, government agencies, government procurement, and re-
search financing, appears intermittently throughout the book, perhaps 
the most interesting discussions concern the following three phenom-
ena: gyosei-shido or "administrative guidance," the form of business 
combination known as keiretsu, and cooperative research ventures. 
The following paragraphs consider the authors' descriptions of each of 
these in tum. 
petroleum refining industry also failed, at a high social cost. P. 22. As late as the mid-1970s, 
there were few sectors in which Japanese research and development activities represented the 
leading edge of technology. P. 10. Remarkably, the automobile and consumer electronics indus-
tries received no special treatment from the government during their formative years, but suc-
ceeded on their own. P. 18. 
4. P. 18. Not only have some supported industries failed while other, unsupported industries 
have become very successful, see note 3 supra, but some scholars view Japan's vigorous private 
sector as the principal cause of the country's economic growth. Patrick believes that industrial 
policy may have influenced Japan's economic growth, but probably was not the primary force 
behind it. Pp. 18-22. 
5. P. 22. It is no longer possible for Japan to identify the important technologies of the 
future by observing the United States. Since Japan now stands at the frontier of technology in 
most sectors, its industrial policy must be increasingly innovative. In addition, Japan's place in 
the world economy has diminished its ability to use trade barriers to promote the growth of its 
high technology industries. P. 23. 
6. See pp. 25-31. In each policy area, the United States may respond to Japanese policy by 
taking no action, seeking Japanese reform, emulating Japanese policy, or counteracting the ef-
fects of Japanese policy on American industries. P. 25. The effects of Japanese policy have 
increasingly been the subject of debate in the United States. P. 26. Patrick outlines the possible 
consequences of various American responses to Japanese policy. See pp. 27-31. 
7. This is the system of floating currency exchange rates adopted by the major trading na-
tions of the world since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1973. See 
S. BLACK, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND NATIONAL EcONOMIC POLICY 1 (1977). 
8. P. 31. Patrick is not the first scholar to note that exchange rates provide the link between 
national economies and the world economy. See, e.g., Bernstein, The Economics of Fluctuating 
Exchange Rates, in EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY 9 (J. Dreyer, G. Haberler & T. Willett eds. 
1978). See generally EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE (A. Hooke 
ed. 1983). 
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The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) and other government agencies may offer administrative 
guidance (informal guidelines without legal sanctions) to help specific 
industries with difficult problems. Administrative guidance is de-
scribed in some detail in Daniel Okimoto's9 essay and reappears at 
several points later in the book. Okimoto asserts that administrative 
guidance has proved quite valuable, since it permits MITI to tailor 
policies selectively to meet changing circumstances without undergo-
ing the rigors of the political process (p. 77). While this technique 
gives a significant amount of power to MITI, the agency may not exer-
cise it without limits.10 In high technology industries, administrative 
guidance has most often been used to prevent price cutting abroad (p. 
77) and to reduce the risks involved in rapid expansion of capacities 
(p. 183). 
Okimoto also describes what is perhaps the most distinctive feature 
of Japanese business organization, the keiretsu. A keiretsu is a group 
of related companies held together by "close and enduring bonds that 
transcend ties of legal contract or short-term market considerations" 
(p. 58). Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Toyota are examples of 
keiretsu. 11 Keiretsu are characterized by the presence of a dominant 
firm which organizes and partially finances the other associated com-
panies, 12 "extensive intra-keiretsu stockholding" (p. 4 7), and frequent 
purchases of intermediate goods from other keiretsu members. 13 
Okimoto argues that while keiretsu impose certain costs in terms of 
economic efficiency, those disadvantages are outweighed by the desir-
ability of the information-sharing function of keiretsu, the horizontal 
linkages represented by keiretsu, and the risk diversification resulting 
from intercorporate stockholding and other financial ties (p. 47). 
Okimoto also examines the additional effects of extensive intercorpo-
rate stockholding, and concludes that the practice has relieved compa-
9. Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Northeast Asia-U.S. Fo-
rum on International Policy at Stanford University. Other works include COMPETITIVE EDGE: 
THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY JN THE U.S. AND JAPAN (D. Okimoto, T. Sugano & F. Wein-
stein eds. 1984); JAPAN'S EcONOMY: COPING WITH CHANGE JN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENT (D. Okimoto ed. 1982). 
10. In a 1974 criminal action against oil refiners and distributors, the Tokyo High Court 
ruled that because of government involvement the corporate defendants committed no criminal 
offense by joining a price fixing cartel created through MITI administrative guidance. However, 
the court found that the cartel itself was illegal because MITI is bound by Japan's Petroleum 
Industry Law of 1972. Some limits, the court believed, had to be imposed on uses of administra-
tive guidance. G. ALLEN, THE JAPANESE EcONOMY 42-43 (1981); see also p. 78. 
11. P. 47; G. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 126. 
12. G. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 126. 
13. P. 85. Okimoto also identifies "heavy reliance on the main keiretsu bank for debt financ-
ing" as a characteristic of keiretsu. See p. 47. However, Professor Allen of the University of 
London suggests that while this was the common practice before World War II, increasing com-
petition within the Japanese banking industry has since led keiretsu members to seek financing 
from outside banks. See G. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 126. 
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nies of concern for short-term profit maximization, allowing them to 
reinvest a larger share of their earnings, which in turn has accelerated 
growth (p. 48). 
The essay by Kozo Y amamura 14 and, to a lesser extent, the essay 
by George Eads15 and Richard Nelson16 consider the antitrust impli-
cations of the cooperative research projects fostered by the Japanese 
government. During the 1950s and 1960s, various laws freed the large 
corporations in high technology industries from virtually all antitrust 
concerns (p. 183). Even without formal exemptions, all cooperative 
research projects seem outside the scope of the Japanese Antimono-
poly Act. 17 Two particularly important cooperative research projects 
that have been completed are the super-high-performance computer 
project, which lasted from 1972 to 1976, and the VLSI (very large 
scale integration) project, undertaken between 1976 and 1979 (pp. 185, 
252). Both of these projects involved extensive cooperation by such 
corporate giants as Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, and Toshiba (p. 188). In 
all, MITI has led several dozen cooperative projects (pp. 185-93). 
Over thirty national projects are presently in progress.18 MITI not 
only tolerates cooperative research, but occasionally uses its influence 
to coerce companies into participation (p. 252). Eads and Nelson sug-
gest that MITI does so because most cooperative research projects are 
of a sufficiently large scope that single companies would be unwilling 
or unable to undertake them and because cooperative research is a 
highly efficient way of using resources (pp. 253-54). 
Y amamura provides a brief overview of several key sections of the 
Japanese Antimonopoly Act. 19 The Act created the Fair Trade Com-
mission (FTC), which has certain limited powers to control monopo-
lies. 20 Even if the FTC establishes that a monopoly exists, which is by 
14. Professor in the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. 
Other works include POLICY AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE EcONOMY: AMERICAN AND 
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES (K. Yarnarnura ed. 1982); s. HANLEY & K. YAMAMURA, EcONOMIC 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN PREINDUSTRIAL JAPAN (1977); K. YAMAMURA, EcONOMIC 
POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1967). 
15. Dean of the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. Other works include 
G. EADS, RELIEF OR REFORM: REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA (1984). 
16. Elizabeth S. and A. Varick Stout Professor of Social Sciences in the Department of Eco-
nomics, Yale University. Other works include R. NELSON, HIGH-TECHNOLOGY POLICIES: A 
FIVE-NATION COMPARISON (1984); GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-IN-
DUSTRY ANALYSIS (R. Nelson ed. 1982); R. NELSON, T. SCHULTZ & R. SLIGHTON, STRUC-
TURAL CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING EcONOMY (1971). 
. 17. P. 252. For additional information on the Antimonopoly Act, see notes 19-22 infra and 
accompanying text. 
18. S. TATSUNO, THE TECHNOPOLIS STRATEGY 36 (1986). 
19. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Law 
No. 54 of 1947, as amended in 1982. For the full text of the Act in English, see H. IYORI & A. 
UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 213-64 (1983). Yarnarnura's overview may be 
found at pp. 194-95. 
20. The FTC may only prosecute a "monopolistic situation" when an industry's annual sales 
exceed fifty billion yen, one company's share of the market exceeds 50% or the shares of the 
1236 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1232 
no means easy, and overcomes the political challenge sure to be 
mounted by MITI, the FTC can not act if such action would "cause a 
loss of international competitiveness" (p. 196). Thus it is perhaps not 
surprising that, although there is an inherent tension between patent 
protection and antitrust laws, 21 the Antimonopoly Act has only rarely 
been used against large holders of patents. Only four Japanese cases 
involve conflicts between patent law and the Antimonopoly Act (p. 
197). 
Japan's High Technology Industries was intended to provide an ob-
jective analysis and evaluation of Japanese high technology industrial 
policy. In actuality it is largely descriptive of Japanese high technol-
ogy industries and government policy toward them, although it does 
carefully examine the success or failure of certain policies. Many of 
the essays compare Japanese and American industries and industrial 
policy; two also draw comparisons with Europe. Although there is an 
extensive literature on the subject of Japanese industrial policy, the 
number of works emphasizing international comparison is fairly small. 
The number of works devoted strictly to high technology industries is 
smaller still. The book's strength is its contribution to this area of 
study. 
This book is of practical value to only a small portion of the legal 
community. Those concerned with trade with Japan may find that the 
book contains some helpful information on the structure of the econ-
omy and of various industries. Similarly, those interested in the com-
parison of American and Japanese law, particularly in the antitrust 
field, may find that certain sections of this book provide a general in-
troduction to the subject. The primary audience for Japan's High 
Technology Industries consists of observers of Japanese industrial pol-
largest two exceed 75%, entry into the industry is extremely difficult, changes in price over time 
are extremely large or small vis-a-vis supply and demand fluctuations, profits or expenses of the 
companies in question are excessive, and the FTC has notified the ministry having jurisdiction 
over the industry (often MITI) and conducted a public hearing. P. 196. No private plaintiff has 
ever successfully brought an antitrust suit in Japan. P. 253. 
21. Patents provide a limited monopoly over the exploitation of some inventions, while anti-
trust laws promote competition. The conflict between the rights afforded by letters patent nnd 
antitrust laws is an old one. In the first reported case addressing the issue, Chief Justice Popham 
wrote, 
[S]uch charter of a monopoly, against the freedom of trade and traffic, is against divers nets 
of Parliament, ... notwithstanding any charter of franchise granted to the contrary, or 
usage, or custom, or judgment given upon such charters, which charters are adjudged by the 
same Parliament to be of no force or effect, and made to the derogation of the Prelates, 
Earls, Barons, and grandees of the realm, and to the oppression of the commons. 
Darcy v. Allein, 11 Coke 84b, 87b-88a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1265 (K..B. 1602). Many American 
courts have been asked to resolve the tension between the patent law and the Sherman Act. See, 
e.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[T]here 
has been a stream of litigation down through the years flowing from the conflict between the 
monopoly rights created by the patent laws on one hand and the national policy favoring compe-
tition expressed in the antitrust laws on the other."). For a more detailed discussion of this 
conflict, see Annotation, Bringing of Patent Infringement Suits as Violation of§§ 1 and 2 of 
Sherman Act (15 USCS §§ 1, 2), 62 A.L.R. FED. 203 (1983). 
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icy; even armchair observers should find the book both accessible and 
interesting. It may well lay the groundwork for further discussion of 
high technology industrial policy within that community. 
- Steven R. Englund 
